

GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

Michael Benjamin Umoh (Ph.D)¹, Emmanuel Azowue O.²,
Ezugwu Kelechi³ and Stella Chinedu Ezea³

¹Department of Political Science, Nasarawa State University, Keffi

^{2,3,4}School of General Studies, Social Science Unit, University of Nigeria, Nsukka
emmanuel.ezowue@unn.edu.ng, 08032608243

Abstract

This study offers a geopolitical examination of the recent Russian incursion into Ukraine and assesses the origins of the conflict in order to forecasts potential future outcomes. The Russian incursion into Ukraine in Europe following World War II has persisted, and the world had observed the development of a dreadful geopolitical crisis. The fundamental source of this conflict was the discord between the geopolitical aspirations of NATO and Russia. As a result, there were apprehensions regarding the resurgence of the New Cold War. The war's impact will mostly hinge on Russia's victory or defeat in Ukraine. Currently, neither Ukraine has suffered defeat nor has Russia achieved victory in the war. However, it is certain that this conflict will have significant ramifications not only for Ukraine and Russia but also for the global community. Regardless of a ceasefire and peace agreement, the political landscape of Europe will irrevocably change. There exists the possibility of conflict escalation with NATO and the EU, including the threat of nuclear weapons, however the likelihood may be minimal.

Keywords: Conflict, Russia, Ukraine, NATO, EU, Geopolitics

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine imports the inaugural significant violent confrontation between two European nations since World War II. The conflict persisted, and the world observed the development of a dire global crisis. Various scholars predominantly overlooked the prognosis of the war and its potential ramifications. The likelihood of a diplomatic resolution to this crisis seems minimal. Consequently, only trepidation and anxiety prevail. The consequences of the war will mostly hinge on Russia's success or failure in Ukraine and, if victorious, the extent of that triumph. Currently, neither Ukraine nor Russia has suffered defeat or achieved victory in the war. Regrettably, the conflict persists. The duration of the conflict remains uncertain (Sim Tack, 2022). A significant victory for Russia in the war would result in its successful occupation of Ukraine. It would effectively engage it. It is feasible that Russia may annex all or part of Ukrainian land. A more modest and less definitive Russian victory is possible. A compromise may also be possible. Russia may consider compromising by retaining the previously annexed Crimea and the territories in Donbas. It may result in the loss of

Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. In every scenario, Russia may achieve either the imposition of a neutral status on Ukraine or the establishment of a buffer zone between Russia and the remaining Ukrainian lands. Any outcome below that threshold will be perceived as a defeat for Russia. The war in Ukraine will undoubtedly influence geopolitical relations among European nations and globally.

Moreover, a comprehensive Russian triumph will facilitate the imposition of its dominance. Certain political analysts think that a Russian triumph would signify the cessation of Western hegemony globally. They argue that it may restore a reconfigured iteration of the Old Russian Empire, albeit the current circumstances differ significantly. It is distinct from the conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the annexation of Crimea. Significant alterations in the political landscape of Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine may occur. There may be a shift in Eastern Europe, particularly regarding the political alignment of Sweden and Finland. Immediately after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, sanctions were imposed on Russia by the Western countries. Numerous analysts anticipate that it will finally lead to the demise of Russia as a whole. However, it is equally accurate that the global community will also be influenced by its political and economic ramifications. The human impact of the fighting on Ukraine is substantial. The bordering countries in Europe are experiencing the spill-over effect of this crisis. It may precipitate considerable upheaval to the global economy as well. The following study offers a geopolitical examination of the conflict in Ukraine. It also delineates the potential ramifications of the Russian incursion into Ukraine.

Objective of the Study

The main objective of the study is to examine the geopolitical positioning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The other objectives are:

1. To explore the key events that led to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine
2. To understand Russia's geopolitical interests
3. To evaluate how the conflicts affect the global economy

Geographical and Political History of Ukraine

Ukraine is a significant geopolitical entity in Europe. The current geography features boundaries with Russia to the east and northeast, Belarus to the northwest, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary to the west, Romania and Moldova to the southwest, and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov to the south and southeast, respectively (Dalaklis, 2015). Geographically, Ukraine is the second-largest country in Europe, following Russia. It has historically been referred to as the breadbasket of the globe due to its vast, productive agricultural plains. The nation continues to be one of the major grain exporters globally. It possesses a substantial foundation of heavy industries, notably the aircraft sector and the industrial equipment business. Moreover, Ukraine's land plays a crucial role in the transportation of energy resources. A significant proportion of

these essential resources is conveyed through Ukraine, including the provision of Russian gas (Dalaklis, 2015).

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine retained the second-largest military in Europe, surpassed only by Russia (Dalaklis, 2015). It is a significant country in European geopolitics. Consequently, it exerts dominance over Eastern Europe, both economically and strategically. Historically, Ukraine has consistently been situated on the periphery of the Russian Empire. Throughout the centuries, external military forces have attacked this territory. Prior to the rise of the Mongols and Tatars in the 10th century, the territory of the Eastern Slavs served as the nucleus of Kievan Rus. It extended across the western region of Russia, Belarus, and central Ukraine. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the northern and western regions fell under Polish and Lithuanian dominion, while the southern area was subjected to Mongol control. Throughout these intervening years, Crimea was governed by the Crimean Khanate (Stork, 2015).

In 1654, the territory of Kievan Rus was annexed by the Tsar, resulting in the unification of Ukraine with Russia. In 1667, with the Truce of Andrusovo, Russia and Poland divided Ukrainian territory along the Dnieper River. The Left Bank territory remained under Russian rule, whilst the Right Bank region fell under Polish control. During the 18th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Western Ukraine (East Galicia), while Russia extended its dominion over eastern Ukraine. It additionally incorporated the recently captured Crimea (Stork, 2015). Following the conclusion of the First World War, a movement advocating for Ukrainian independence arose, although it remained merely a movement. Upon the Bolsheviks' ascendance to power, Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1921, Ukraine was reallocated under the Treaty of Riga. Subsequently, Eastern Ukraine was annexed by the USSR, while Western and Eastern Galicia were restored to Poland (Stork, 2015). In December 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine attained independence.

Understanding Ukraine's Importance in Global Politics and Strategy

The location of Ukraine is strategically important from a geopolitical standpoint. When it comes to international safety, it has long been a major player. Many experts predicted that the dispute between both superpowers will shape global affairs for the next several decades, and the country is still at the forefront of this renewed animosity (Jonathan, 2022).

Approximately fifty years ago, Ukraine played a pivotal role in the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was America's sworn enemy as a Soviet Republic. Its population ranked second in the Soviet Union, only below that of Russia. Its strength was comparable to that of the Soviet Republics. It was also highly significant to the Soviet Union from a military standpoint. Ukraine possessed a portion of the nation's nuclear arsenal. The Black Sea Fleet also had its home there. The events surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union altered global geopolitics and the geography of Eurasia.

Because of Ukraine's strategic importance, the Soviet Union's decision to cut ties with the country dealt a crushing blow to its global dominance. A "Civilised Divorce" is the preferred term. As per President Putin's claims, the breakup of Russia was the "greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century" (Emmanuel, 2015). It makes sense, considering how crucial Ukraine was to Russia in more than one way. Slavic traditions and a lengthy border unite Russia and Ukraine. For Russia, the situation in Ukraine was emblematic of its global identity and aspirations. Therefore, Russia has always denied that Ukraine is an independent nation. In a statement to President Bush in 2008, Putin stated that, "Ukraine 'is not even a country'" (Peter, 2015).

Following its independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine desired Western alliance, specifically NATO and the European Union. Russia now faces a new challenge due to the altered geopolitical landscape in Ukraine. Actually, many Russians viewed the loss of permanent control of Ukraine and its subsequent ascent into Western orbit as a devastating blow to Russian supremacy and worldwide status. The preservation of Russia's cultural and historical links to its neighbours has always been a priority. Furthermore, both nations' economies were highly dependent on one another until relatively recently (Tsygankov, 2015). Even more so, according to Tsygankov (2015), Russia sought to protect its security interests in Ukraine by ensuring that the country remained independent of NATO. This was where the crisis in Ukraine began.

Geopolitics of Existence

Each geopolitical entity must protect its self-interested security interests if it wants to stay in existence. Threats to a nation's security, including its sovereignty and territorial integrity, could take many forms, including invasion, alteration, manipulation, and exploitation. To stay alive, each nation must be protected from these dangers/threats. Russia was most angered by the West's expansion into its area of influence. Moreover, Russia despised the way the West took advantage of the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe, especially the conflicts in Bosnia (1994–1995), NATO expansion, and Serbia (1999).

The employment of NATO soldiers against Serbs in Bosnia in 1994 and subsequently Serbia itself was an effort to alter the political landscape of Eastern Europe. These strategies ultimately resulted in Kosovo's autonomy and eventual independence. Russia found it demeaning because of the historical links between Russia and Serbia. Conflict arose between Russia and NATO because of result of this. According to Emmanuel (2015), Russia made it clear she was unhappy with the United States and other Western nations for using double standards in international affairs.

Inviting several Eastern European nations to join NATO, while the EU was the Western initiative that had the most impact on the relationship between NATO and Russia. The Russian government saw NATO's expansion as a way for the United States to increase her influence in the world. A formal invitation to join NATO was extended to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1999. The second and more significant

NATO expansion in 2004 was also seen by Russia as an American challenge. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all joined NATO and the European Union at the same time. Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia all became members of these states. Due to the proximity of the Baltic States to Russia's capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, NATO has progressed to the borders of Russia.

Russia was understandably worried about the Baltic States' participation because of their history as a Soviet Republic. The United States and the rest of the West were keen on expanding NATO even further. At the time, the list of nations to be admitted to NATO included Ukraine and Georgia. Russia could only take so much before it was punished politically and economically. It was obvious that these two nations were under Russia's influence. In 2008, during its summit, NATO extended membership invitations to Croatia and Albania while simultaneously welcoming Georgia and Ukraine. The 2008 crisis in Georgia was the final straw for Russia. The situation in Crimea in 2014 was the pinnacle of it all. There are Western experts who believe Russia's invasion of Ukraine was the climax of Moscow's hatred of NATO's post-Cold War expansion into the area formerly occupied by the Soviet Union. While outlining the chain reaction that brought about these unfortunate events in Ukraine, Professor John Mearsheimer astutely noted that, according to Western conventional wisdom, Russian aggression was nearly and solely to blame for the crisis in that country (Jonathan, 2022). Russia may pursue the remainder of Ukraine and other nations in Eastern Europe in the future, according to the theory that Russia's annexation of Crimea was motivated by a long-standing desire to recreate the Soviet Empire. There is no denying the clear aggressive component in Russia's takeover of Crimea and support for terrorists in Eastern Ukraine. While this was true, the United States and her European allies are equally to be blamed for the situation (Dalaklis, 2015). The substantial eastward expansion of the European Union and the ongoing enlargement of NATO are also seen as aggressive moves. It was reasonable to anticipate a swift response in international relations when boundaries are breached (Dalaklis, 2015). Russia and Ukraine's conflict has geopolitical and geostrategic dimensions. The West ought to have acted reasonably towards Russia and Ukraine considering that, according to Moscow, Ukraine was inside of Russia's sphere of influence. From a realist point of view, at least, that was what one could anticipate. But it never materialized, because the West failed to acknowledge Russia's interests in Eurasia, a conflict between Russia and Ukraine was likely (if not unavoidable) (Tsygankov, 2022). This new crisis had its roots in the last one.

Russian Geopolitics and the Ukraine Crisis

Since their 1991 independence from the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine have had tensed relations (Rutland, 2020). Over the last 30 years, Ukraine's ties to NATO and the European Union have grown closer. But balancing its global contacts with mending its severe internal conflicts had been a challenge for Ukraine. In contrast to the largely

Russian and Russian-speaking populations in the East, the majority of Ukrainians residing in the West of the country advocated stronger relations with Russia. In 2009, the eminent Russian geopolitical analyst Alexander Dugin foretold that Ukraine would be split into two distinct geopolitical entities - Eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine. He argued this point from his own perspective. Dugin claimed that if Ukraine were divided along regional lines, its eastern half would form an alliance with Russia and its western half would perpetually gaze west towards Europe. In addition, Dugin has predicted Russia's ascendancy and Western domination. For a long time, he patiently waited for Russia to assert her global leadership (Scott, 2020). For Russia, the security of Ukraine is of the utmost importance. It is especially vulnerable to Western invasions due to its unusual geographical situation. Both Hitler and Napoleon attempted to invade Russia through its Western frontiers on two separate occasions (Sauer, 2017). On Russia's western border, the biggest country is Ukraine. Since Russia will not abide Ukraine's membership in NATO, a buffer zone was essential to address this pressing security concern (Dalaklis, 2015).

From a geopolitical perspective, both Russia and Ukraine would have benefited from an impartial Ukraine. For geopolitical reasons, having amicable neighbours is also important to Russia. A neutral Ukraine has always been a goal for Russia. This would have allowed Russia to create a large buffer zone in Eastern Europe, shielding the Russian Empire from potential future dictators like Hitler and Napoleon. Ukraine and Russia should seriously explore this alternative. The only way out of Russia's existential geopolitical predicament was to consciously create an artificial buffer, even if imposing neutrality upon Ukraine would not be feasible for very long. All of these took place in 2014, but by annexing Crimea and aiding the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, Putin has shown more restraint than Dugin would be pleased with (Wasielewski, 2022). When people do not trust one another, it leads to increased tension, conflict, and war. The most pressing issue was the encroachment on Russia's spheres of influence along her western borders, which poses a threat to Russia's very survival. It was believed that the current geopolitical manoeuvring is essential in order to feel safe from the hostilities of the West. Even the presence of NATO military forces in the region can be seen by the Russians as an aggressive move that necessitates appropriate reprisals, so it was seen as compensatory geopolitical manoeuvring to protect its spheres of influence in the West (Dalaklis, 2015). As of Russia's acquisition of Crimea, no European nation had acquired land from another since the end of World War II. According to Sauer (2017), its original intent was to prevent would-be invaders from ever considering targeting their nation. The goal was to make the area more secure and stable. Ukrainian connections to NATO have grown in recent years, even though the country was not a member. Ukraine joined NATO as an enhanced opportunity partner in 2020 and has since participated in yearly military exercises with the alliance. This status is reserved for the closest non-member allies of NATO. In addition, Jonathan (2022)

reports that Ukraine has stated its intention to become a full member of NATO in the future.

Russia demanded that the United States and NATO stop growing their alliance as one of numerous security demands in the weeks preceding its attack. Russia sought U.S. approval to withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe and NATO deployment guarantees. However, the United States has stated that it will not close NATO's doors to potential new members. With Ukraine serving as a buffer state, Russia attacked the country in February 2022 for geostrategic reasons. It prevents a Western invasion of Moscow. That is, the West had been encroaching on Russian territory and endangering Russia's fundamental strategic interests (Dalaklis, 2015). Additionally, it seeks to alter the regional geopolitical landscape.

Geopolitical Prospects of Ukraine

Putin openly stated that Russia's goal was to stop NATO from expanding near Russia's borders, even if Russia's exact goals regarding the invasion of Ukraine remain unclear. Russia must have a strategic interest in this conflict if it is involved. Expanding the buffer zone around the Donbas Republics in Eastern Ukraine appears to be Russia's top priority. And it's all about reducing Ukraine's military might to the point where the country gives up on joining the EU and NATO. In addition, similar to its 2014 actions in the Donbas, Moscow sought to partition Southern Ukraine, including the Kherson region. Russia may attempt to utilise the seized regions as leverage in peace talks with Ukraine, maybe involving demands over Ukrainian aspirations for EU and NATO membership. Changing the government in Ukraine was another way for Russia to accomplish her aims. These actions would impact on Ukraine greatly and for a long time. Whatever the situation may be, Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity might be at stake in this conflict. The political landscape of Europe might shift as a result. Russia can pursue a variety of geostrategic options. These options are predicated on the premise that Russia will emerge victorious.

Should Russia emerge victorious, their goal will be to alter the political landscape of Ukraine. The result will be the disintegration of Ukraine into its constituent parts. If Russia were to invade Ukraine, her goal would be to conquer the country and incorporate all or part of its territory into Russia. A huge portion of Ukrainian territory could be targeted by Russia if this does not stop. Under such circumstances, it will make an effort to claim territory west of the Dnieper River (Philip, 2022). Then make this additional area an integral part of Russia. This would mean that a large portion of Ukraine would be under Russian authority. Regardless, Ukraine will continue to play a major role in international politics. The Dnieper River cuts Ukraine in half, as can be seen from even the most basic map of the nation (Enis. 2017). In the past, the Dnieper divided two rival regions of Ukraine. This situation could occur once more. Attempts to partition the country were already known to former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko in 2014, when he made the announcement public. A new

"Berlin Wall" between East and West could be formed by the rivers of Ukraine (Enis, 2017). Russia is likely to attempt to divide the country in half along the Dnieper River, which cuts through the centre, if this becomes a reality. A new geopolitical border between Russia and Ukraine would thus include the Dnieper River. Over the parts of Ukraine that have not yet been absorbed, Russia will attempt to set up a puppet administration. For Russia, this would represent a major geopolitical victory.

Russia could even attempt to invade Ukraine and take over territory to the West of the Dnieper River, which would include Odessa and other cities in the region. Odessa will serve as a link between the autonomous Transdnistria area and Russian territory. According to Wasilewski (2022), this means that Russia can cut off Ukraine's access to the Black Sea. With this choice, Ukraine loses some of its western territory. To make sure Ukraine can't survive, Moscow would absorb all of the surrounding territories into Russia. The idea that Russia would attempt to conquer a geographical corridor connecting Russia and Transnistria was another plausible scenario. With Mariupol, Kherson, and Odessa included, it could cover a rather extensive region (Wasielewski, 2022). Because of this, Russia will try to prevent Ukraine from reaching the sea. This choice will protect Ukraine from the sea while leaving a large portion of the country unencumbered. Crimea will likewise be less vulnerable as a result. With its present borders, Crimea is extremely exposed, with only a single bridge linking it to Russian territory.

Another distinct possibility was that Russia may attempt to invade and conquer all of Ukraine. Under such circumstances, it might declare the birth of a new Slavic Union comprising Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (Wasielewski, 2022). After that, the frontiers of the New Russian Union will change in relation to NATO member states. Selecting this alternative also entails taking over the entire nation. Russia, however, will have a hard time assimilating the Ukrainian population. They might actively or quietly fight against occupation. In that case, insurgency will break out in the occupied territory. The situation involving the frozen conflict could drag on for quite a while. There will be a resistance movement in Ukraine even if they lose this war. Then the West would try to back an insurrection in Ukraine, and Russia and Ukraine would be at war all the time. It can end up being too expensive of a profession. Russia, however, could succeed in her endeavours.

Methodology

The study adopted document analytic method of data collection and analysis. The methodology is an arm of the qualitative method of data collection and analysis, and it required the review and analyzing of relevant literatures, media reports, academic journals, newspapers and magazine publications, seminar presentations that relates to the subject matter which basically deals on the geopolitical analysis of Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Implications of the War in Ukraine

Ukrainian conflict as far as Europe is concerned, the crisis of 2022 will be the worst since the Cold War's conclusion. Ukraine is in ruins due to the war. Ruins now cover many of its cities. Her population has seen more than 25% displacement or refugee status. The war's influence had gone beyond Ukraine's boundaries and affect countries well beyond her control (Tack, 2022). There would be a sea change in international politics as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. If Russia were to win, Western dominance in the global arena would come to an end. Peace and security on a global scale will also be affected. It would appear that Russia's geopolitical objectives are currently focused on Ukraine, but the situation may easily escalate into a wider battle. The unrest might potentially spread to neighbouring countries. Russia may obviously not go to launch an attack on NATO member states given the current state of affairs. Nevertheless, there is a fear among some western researchers that confrontation could escalate with NATO. The possibility of nuclear war may also be a part of it.

Implication on the Global Economy

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine poses threat to global economic growth and further increases inflationary pressures, which are already elevated. While no major economy counts Ukraine among her commercial partners, Russia counts China, the United States, Germany, France, and Italy among her most important import partners. The conflict's effects on the global economy are multi-faceted (Chotiner, 2022). Key goods supplied by the Ukrainian and Russian economies include wheat, maize, palladium, titanium, and palladium. Users of these commodities (such as manufacturers of cars, smartphones, and aeroplanes) would feel the effects of high pricing intensified by disruptions to their supply chains. As a second point, increased inflation could likely result from a sharp spike in energy costs caused by Russia's position as a leading global oil producer and exporter (Chotiner, 2022). Another route was the mass exodus from Ukraine; according to the UNHCR, the number of refugees could reach 4 million as the crisis develops; however, this figure is highly dependent on factors such as border restrictions, the duration of the conflict, and the post-war economic stability of the country. The study projects two-million-dollar annual net outflow for 2022 and 2023 (Tack, 2022).

In addition, companies may be hesitant to invest due to political risk and uncertainty, which could increase savings rates. The study's simulations showed that the global GDP could fall by half a percent in 2022 and nearly a full percent in 2023 due to the crisis in Ukraine. This amounts to approximately \$1 trillion in lost GDP. It raises the cost of living and may further reduce household spending by adding 3% to global inflation in 2022 and around 2% in 2023. We anticipate greater public expenditure to address the significant demographic issues posed by the influx of Ukrainian refugees, which we perceive primarily as a European problem. Furthermore, NATO military expenditure is anticipated to rise as a result of the conflict (Wasielewski,

2022). Expenditures on defence and help for refugees are expected to put a strain on resources, leading to inflation. The study predicts a 0.9 percentage point decline in Eurozone GDP growth in 2022 and a 1.5 percentage point decline in 2023 compared to the February prediction, using the Global Econometric Model (NiGEM). Moreover, compared to study's previous estimates of 3.1% in 2022 and 1.3% in 2023, now anticipates inflation reaching 5.5% in that year and 2.1% in the following year. The conflict has the potential to lower GDP growth in the UK by 0.8% to 4.0% in 2022 and 0.5% in 2023 due to Russia's high level of exposure to the country (Wasielewski, 2022). Russia is a major global supplier of energy and metals; a spike in their prices would hit economies all across the globe. Nearly 40% of Europe's natural gas and 25% of its oil come from Russia. Runaway inflation, another economic downturn, or both are now far more likely as a result of Russia's confrontation with Europe. U.S. and Western sanctions on Russia's economy are the most extensive and harsh ever imposed on a major country, in response to Putin's aggressive actions. They have significantly hampered Moscow's access to its foreign currency reserves, cut off high-tech exports to Russia, and kicked major Russian banks out of the SWIFT international payment system. It seemed like Putin's regime was caught unawares by the swift and coordinated worldwide reaction against Russia (Tsygankov, 2022). After already rising by 20% before the conflict broke out, the price of natural gas skyrocketed another 20% and is currently almost six times what it was at the beginning of 2021. Increases in both inflation and electricity expenses are being fuelled by the petrol price shock. Because of this, households are less able to spend money, and the anticipation of a spending boom due to loosening pandemic restrictions and fewer COVID-19 cases has faded (Rutland, 2020).

Economists use the term "demand destruction" to describe the reduction in output by gas-intensive industrial firms like fertiliser manufacturers as a result of the recent spike in petrol prices. The cost to operate machinery and purchase fertiliser has increased for farmers. If the German economy continues to contract in the first quarter of 2022 after contracting by 0.7% in the last quarter of 2021, a technical recession would be the result. A rise in German defence spending could counteract the economic downturn. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has stated that the government could increase defence spending over 2% of GDP and dedicate 100 billion euros (USD 111 billion) to a special fund in reaction to the Russian invasion (Rutland, 2022). Berenberg Bank chief economist Holger Schmieding predicted that the Eurozone's real GDP growth for 2022 would be as low as 3.7% due to the drag from increasing prices and the negative confidence effect. Companies throughout the world are rushing to obtain enough raw materials and components to meet the soaring demand for their goods as a result of the surprisingly rapid recovery from the pandemic slump. Shipping delays, price increases, and shortages have resulted from overcrowded ports, factories, and freight yards. It may take longer for things to get back to normal if disruptions hit Russian and Ukrainian industries (Tsygankov, 2022).

According to Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi, 70% of the world's neon, an essential ingredient in semiconductor production, was produced by Russia and Ukraine combined. There is already a global scarcity of computer chips, and that worries automakers even more. Zandi points out that chipmakers have subsequently accumulated neon and sought alternatives to Russian sources (Tsygankov, 2022), but neon costs spiked 600% after Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine eight years ago. According to Zandi, of the world's titanium—used in passenger jets—and palladium—found in automobiles, telephones, and dental fillings—13 percent and 30 percent, respectively—are supplied by Russia and Ukraine. Steel and electric vehicle batteries both rely on nickel, which Russia is a big manufacturer of as well. An expert in supply chains at Foley & Lardner LLP, Vanessa Miller, has stated that it's impossible for supply chains to go backwards. The Central Asian countries that border Russia will also feel the effects of the conflict and penalty measures. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are among Russia's most popular destinations for youthful migrant workers due to the country's ageing native workforce. The remittances sent home by these workers have become an important source of income for their families (Rutland, 2022).

Transfers from Russia to Uzbekistan exceeded USD 3.9 billion and to Kyrgyzstan USD 2 billion, even during the peak of COVID-19 in 2020, as reported by the Russian central bank. According to Gavin Helf, a specialist on Central Asia for the US Institute of Peace, the global exports of wheat, maize, and sunflower oil—all of which are utilised in food processing—account for 30 percent, 19 percent, and 80 percent, respectively, for Russia and Ukraine, respectively. This means that the collapse of Russia's labour market, banking restrictions on foreigners, and the pressure on the ruble could all have significant and immediate effects on Central Asia's economy. Poor and unstable nations like Libya and Yemen receive a disproportionate share of the dividend from Russia and Ukraine. At a time when food prices are at their highest levels since 2011 and certain countries are experiencing food shortages, the threat to farms in eastern Ukraine and a cutoff of exports through Black Sea ports might exacerbate the problem. The results are "very disturbing," according to UMass Amherst management professor Anna Nagurney (Tsygankov, 2022).

Conclusion

Actually, a long-running dispute has escalated into the current war in Ukraine. It all began in 2014 with the situation in Crimea. "It was always the goal of Putin to restore Russia to its previous status of a great nation (dominant nation) at least in Eurasia," argues Gerard Toal, a professor of international affairs at Virginia Tech, in his book *Near Abroad*. "Restoring Russia's greatness was the ultimate objective, not recreating the Soviet Union" (Jonathan Masters, 2022). Russia claims its security interests in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus necessitate its establishment of an exclusive sphere of influence. However, Russia's primary goal in the conflict with Ukraine was to restore Russian control and influence. Mearsheimer blames the United States for

inciting Putin's strong foreign policy in the former Soviet Republics, despite the fact that many international relations specialists, and especially Putin's detractors, have contended that Putin would act aggressively regardless of Western intervention. According to Chotiner (2022), Mearsheimer pointed out that "the United States and her European allies share most of the responsibility for this crisis" in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea.

Geostrategic considerations led Russia to invade Ukraine because Ukraine served as a buffer between Russia and potential Western invasions (Friedman, 2022). The Kremlin viewed NATO's eastward expansion, particularly into the oil of Ukraine, their neighbours as the cardinal sin of post-Soviet foreign relations that must be stopped. This has far-reaching geopolitical implications, including the removal of American nuclear weapons from Europe and the Russian area of influence, the reversal of the previous expansion of NATO, and the conclusion of NATO expansion. Another possible interpretation is that the other side is trying to ensure that Moscow would always have control over any military or economic alliance that includes Ukraine and Georgia. This conflict boiled down to two main points: first, whether Russia's neighbours would pose an existential threat to Moscow, or second, whether they would recognise Moscow's presence in their midst and adjust their foreign policies to suit regional geopolitical interests. The solution to all of our problems, both old and new, is pragmatism.

Recommendation

The study concluded that, given the current situation and the extent to which the Russia-Ukraine conflict has impacted on both sides and society at large, the following measures should be taken:

1. The US and EU must convene peace talks amongst the warring factions and attempt to mend fences by declaring a "No Victor, No Vanquish" truce.
2. Russia views Ukraine's membership in NATO as a danger to its national security, so the US should stop pushing for Ukraine to join the alliance.
3. With the number of fatalities and deaths on both sides continuing to rise everyday, it is imperative that both sides announce a cease fire.
4. Russia must end its actual or perceived intention to annex any portion of Ukraine in order for her government to acknowledge the United Nations Charter, which forbids meddling with the geographical limits of a sovereign nation.
5. In order to show that there is a genuine desire for reconciliation and peace between the two warring nations, it is necessary to withdraw some of the economic restrictions imposed on Russia.
6. It is imperative that the war between Russia and Ukraine be ended immediately since its continuation will have a more negative impact on the world economy, which is already struggling.

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